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Diversity, Democracy and Dialogue in a
Human Rights Framework
Carol C. Gould
With the growing awareness of the power and scope of
globalization in its various dimensions, and the growing
importance of the institutions of global governance, hopes have
increasingly been placed on the development of a global public
sphere of discourse and deliberation. The idea is that within this
sphere-or better, spheres-dialogue can take place among
diverse people representing a range of cultural perspectives and
that by mobilizing this dialogue it may be possible to devise ways
for people around the world to provide input into the decisions
and policies of global governance institutions and of other global
actors that increasingly impact their lives. If people cannot
participate directly, as is unlikely given their numbers, then this
global public sphere may perhaps function to facilitate the
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representation of their views by NOOs or others. The recent
literature also emphasizes the role of newly inclusive deliberative
processes at the transnational level that would strive to take into
account the viewpoints and contributions of those at a distance
who are affected by these policies but who have not thus far been
powerful enough to influence their formation or direction. I And,
recognizing the limitations of earlier overly rationalist models of
deliberative democratic process, a broader array of features have
recently entered the picture as desirable features of such dialogic
procedures, including empathy and responsiveness, as called for
by feminist philosophers and some political theorists.2
In this paper, I will examine the possibilities for
intercultural dialogue and for more effective deliberative
processes in a global public sphere, largely in online contexts, but
also as involving opportunities for face to face interactions. I will
consider some ideas for bringing transnational forms of dialogue
and deliberation into the "epistemic communities" of the
institutions of global governance and influencing other powerful
2
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global actors such as corporations. Extending a model I have
developed in previous work, I will further suggest that such
transnational deliberation, whether in newly formed regional
communities or within international organizations (governmental
or nongovernmental), needs to be framed by human rights
agreements that are adopted at regional or transnational-if not
fully global-Ievels.3
The motivation for this recommendation begins from the
recognition that globalization has generated an increasing number
of cross-border communities, whether they be centered around
ecological, economic, or political concerns, or take the form of
voluntary associations, e.g., on the Internet. Such communities
may be locally cross-border, or regional, or fully global. In order
to protect the rights of individuals and communities operating
within these broader contexts, I suggest that new regional
agreements on human rights are needed to supplement those
already in existence (in Europe and the ED, in Africa and in the
Interamerican context) along with the global agreements that
3
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have been introduced heretofore. Human rights here are of course
to be understood as importantly including economic and social
rights, as well as civil and political ones. But we will see that
these new agreements also raise issues of the diversity of
cultures, and would themselves seem to require some degree of
dialogue and deliberation in both their drafting and interpretation.
Thus the focus in this paper on expanding participation in
regional or global decisions through dialogue among diverse
agents in a global public sphere necessarily involves us in a
consideration of human rights frameworks, which are themselves
partly dialogue dependent (but only in part).
Problems in Extending Dialogue and Deliberation Across
Borders
First, a few provisional comments about dialogue and
deliberation: In the discussion that follows, I will not be taking
dialogue as foundational for the justification of global norms nor
do I regard the notion of deliberation as the primary meaning of
4
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democracy in transnational contexts. Rather, in my view, norms
need to be grounded in a social ontology of human beings in
relationships, and democracy requires more than deliberation. It
requires actually making decisions (with majority rule as the
leading possibility here, though not the only one), as well as
forms of mutual recognition among persons, along with broad
opportunities for participation in social, economic and political
life. Moreover, democracy crucially presupposes the fulfillment
of a set of human rights, including economic rights to means of
subsistence. (For without the fulfillment of these rights, people
who are impoverished will often lack the leisure and the civic
opportunities necessary for such participation.) Despite these
cautions and complexities, we can say that deliberation is a
crucial feature of democratic processes that seek to foster some
measure of agreement about common interests and common
goods and that aim at decisions based on inclusive, rational, and
empathic procedures, involving reciprocal recognition of the
equality of participants and an equal consideration of their
5
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importantly affected interests. And dialogue is clearly a central
feature in the interpretation and application of transnational
norms and serves as a condition for their emergence as more than
projections of one-sided ways of life. I will develop these
philosophical points a bit more below.
Here I want to highlight a set of significant problems--
both theoretical and practical-- that come to the surface when it is
recognized that with globalization, and the new forms of
powerful transnational institutions that it entails, dialogue and
deliberation often need to extend across borders. There is the by
now standard question of how to construe dialogue among people
with different cultural backgrounds, and especially how to
recognize relevant cultural differences while preserving an
emphasis on a certain set of universalistic norms (especially
human rights) and an emphasis on people's equality, including
centrally women's equality. In addition, we need to determine
what factors contribute to making cross-border deliberative
processes effective, if we are to find ways to enable input into the
6
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institutions of global governance by those affected by their
decisions, and well as to give stakeholders a say in regard to the
decisions of multinational corporations or even of nation-states,
since distant others may well be importantly affected by their
policies and activities. My interest in this connection is especially
on enabling participation by the affected people of the Global
South in the "epistemic communities,,4 of global governance
institutions, and I will also touch on some of the fundamental
questions involved in structuring cross-border dialogue. It can be
seen, then, that deliberation across borders is confronted by
several deep difficulties that need to be analyzed and I will make
a few proposals for dealing with these difficulties in a later
section of this paper. It is clear that we need to get beyond the
general calls for "intercultural dialogue" that have marked
discussions to this point.
Online dialogue and deliberation provides an especially
promising focus for enabling input into the decisions of global
institutions, and several theorists have looked to online
7
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVIII No. I
information and discourse as a way to achieve greater openness
and accountability in the institutions of global governance.5 In
the domestic context, much has already been written about the
role of facilitation, about the use of deliberative forums in e-
government or e-democracy, as well as about the problem of the
digital divide.6 Although in what follows I suggest that it may
indeed be possible to open the deliberations of global governance
and other highly influential bodies to input by remotely situated
publics, I think it is necessary to avoid the over-romanticism that
has characterized some discussions of these possibilities, and to
ask an array of hard questions. Although I can only mention
these, rather than resolve them, here, we can note the concerns
about who will be included--will they be credentialed participants
or else people at large? Will people be permitted to participate
anonymously, or will authentication and the identification of
participants be required? Who will take seriously all the potential
input, and how will it be sifted down? Or are we only talking of
something like public ombudspersons? Already there is digital
8
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overload--multiple arenas with large numbers of often
anonymous participants, with few of the interventions rising to
the level of any real influence over policy. Furthermore, instead
of the open discussion among people with very different
perspectives that has been thought to be required in deliberative
politics, many online discussions groups have been limited (most
often self-limited) to like-minded participants. And instead of
reasoned argument, there is quite often shouting, assertions with
little argument, etc.
Of course, of the power of internet communication in
politics we can have no doubt. We have recently observed its
formidable possibilities in organizing and mobilizing people, for
example, in the recent pro-democracy movements in Iran,
protesting the absence of a fair electoral process. (There was also
important use of cell phones, and especially text messaging, in
that case.) Online organizing has also characterized other social
movements, whether in the context of the World Social Forum or
solidarity struggles in Latin America. But these forceful
9
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possibilities do not immediately transfer to inclusive processes of
orderly deliberation, though they can enhance the responsiveness
of existing decision procedures. Yet it is evident that people want
input into the decisions that affect them, and one can expect that
they will take advantage of opportunities for such input, if they
are real and meaningful, and go beyond the currently dominant
forms (at least in the U.S.) of polling and surveys. Nonetheless,
the question remains how to structure such input and processes of
online deliberation, and how to address the cross-cultural and
cross-border dimensions they will have.
The analysis of cross-border dialogue and deliberation
here focuses primarily on two key issues and on the normative
framework for addressing them: First, the presence of systematic
misunderstanding, which I will address in the third section of the
paper with a specific proposal concerning highlighting contested
categories in online deliberations. And second, the barrier posed
to equal participation by the digital divide and by global
inequalities more generally. It can be noted that these two themes
10
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are interrelated in virtue of the need to bring an understanding of
power disparities and oppressive historical and current conditions
into the very framing of transnational discourses. Thus it is
necessary not only to explicitly confront these inequalities but
also to find new ways of acknowledging them and dealing with
them.
There are two additional important issues, which I can
only mention, but not discuss here: one concerns the significant
effects produced by governmental restrictions or interventions
into these discussions, including restrictions on or interference in
online discourse. The second is the difficult question of the
language to be used in cross-border deliberations, and in
particular the current domination of English for these purposes, at
least in contexts of trade and diplomacy.
II
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Norms of Democratic Discourse and Human Rights in
Intercultural, Global Contexts
If we go back to the characteristics of discourse
demarcated in the iconic discussions of it (especially in Jurgen
Habermas and later in Seyla Benhabib and others) as well as in
the democratic deliberation literature (Joshua Cohen, John
Dryzek, James Bohn1an, Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson,
Iris Marion Young, and others), we can note the essential claim
that people are supposed to be free and equal to enter into the
dialogue or discourse. Moreover, they are (normatively at least)
regarded as reciprocally related in terms of opportunities for
listening and being heard, and are supposed to use reasoning to
achieve agreements that take into account the perspectives of
others.7 As noted, going somewhat beyond the original emphasis
on rational argument in coming to agreements on "generalizable"
or shared interests, feminist and other theorists focused attention
on the importance of a felt understanding and responsiveness
toward the positions and needs of others.
12
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While I have reservations about taking deliberation or
discourse as constitutive of democracy, 8 it clearly is a central
feature of effective democracy, if democratic decision making is
to be more than an aggregation of interests or a pure compromise
between antagonistically defined positions. Of course, this is not
to say that consensus has to be achieved in all these deliberations·
or that it is even reasonably understood as the aim. But some
measure of agreement that goes beyond pure power struggles or
simple compromise is normally regarded as a goal of these
discourses, and held to be achievable through rules that ensure
reciprocity, freedom and equality of participants, etc. However,
when such dialogue or deliberation occurs across borders,
whatever inequalities may have marked national or domestic
discourses are compounded by the deep inequalities that pervade
North-South relations, as well as by striking divergences in
cultural practices, and by language differences.
Further, new questions of scope emerge inasmuch as the
extent of the demos or public, or of membership in the
13
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community of discourse, is radically in question in transnational
deliberative contexts. I have elsewhere discussed this question of
scope at some length and have proposed two criteria that I take to
be relevant: The first involves the extension of traditional
notions of political and other communities to cross-border or
transnational contexts and centers around a notion of common
activities. Here the criterion is the constitution of an ongoing
community understood as oriented to shared goals, where these
may be embedded in relevant practices and institutions, though
normally there is also an intentional (and intensional) aspect, that
is, the community understands itself to be oriented to the goals in
question. The second criterion involves a new use of the all-
affected principle to demarcate those at a distance who should be
able to provide input into discourses and decisions when they are
importantly affected by a given decision or policy.9
The all-affected principle has often been used to argue for
democratic participation or representation by the relevant people
into decisions, originally taken to be applicable to citizens of a
14
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nation-state. However, in global contexts, as I and others have
argued previously, too many people are affected or potentially
affected by a decision or policy to use this criterion in its most
general sense to pick out relevant participants. Moreover, people
are most often differentially affected by various decisions in a
way that militates against an interpretation of "affectedness" in
terms of a notion of global citizenship per se. Nonetheless, the
notion that people at a distance are affected by the decisions of
transnational governance institutions and other powerful actors
does seem to argue for their having some input into the decisions
in question. In order to avoid the vagueness aspect of being
affected in global contexts, it seems clear, then, that we need to
demarcate those decisions in which people "importantly affected"
in order to make this criterion usable. But this still leaves open
the question of how to determine who is "importantly" affected. I
have elsewhere proposed a particular interpretation of
"importantly affected" for the global context, to delineate who
should have some input into the decisions and policies in
15
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question. In particular, I have argued that when people are
affected in their possibilities of fulfilling their basic human rights
they can be considered "importantly affected" and should have
rights to participate, or more weakly, to provide input into those
decisions or policies. to Thus where decisions significantly bear
on whether people can meet their economic means of subsistence,
i.e., basic economic human rights, these affected people need to
be able to influence or affect the decisions that are made.
Given this normative requirement of obtaining democratic
input by dispersed publics, the question arises of how it can
proceed if it involves communication that includes people in
societies that may not allow open discourses or are not
democratically organized, or where some members of the society
are thought to be unable or unqualified to participate, even if the
technological and other means for them to do so are available. Of
course, a key case here concerns women who may be
discriminated against or oppressed or held to be inappropriate
participants, or perhaps simply lack the time or skills to
16
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participate. More generally, we can observe that deliberation in
the epistemic communities of global governance has thus far
been limited to elites; in these contexts, the extension of inputs to
broader publics and a fortiori to marginalized groups is thus
difficult to envision. There are at least two central concerns--one
is cultural, where the required free and equal participation
confronts existing dominant cultural norms or practices, and the
second is social and economic, namely, the challenge of enabling
participation by people who may be impoverished or oppressed.
A seemingly easy solution to extending deliberation across
cultural borders would seem to be afforded by recognizing that
all we need to do is give a place at the table to excluded women
and other marginalized or unequal groups. However, doing so
often presupposes the existence of the very equality and opelmess
of societies or their democratic organization that we are hoping to
produce by the extension of democratic deliberation
transnationally and that have in fact been lacking in the society in
17
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question. This could be regarded as a paradox (or at least a
conundrum) of deliberative democracy in cross-border contexts.
The requirement that we hear from women or oppressed
groups arises in answer to the very relevant question "Who
speaks for a culture?" Thus we can quite rightly object to simply
accepting definitions of cultures promulgated by dominant elites
or governments or those who benefit from the proposed cultural
definition. (Moreover, we can object to the unified notions of
culture these dominant interpretations often imply.) Oppression
and even coercive or repressive practices are specifically
insidious in suppressing alternative interpretations of cultural
traditions and practices that would likely be offered by
marginalized groups if they had access to the education, leisure,
and other opportunities needed to advance their own cultural
interpretations and emphases. I would suggest that the recent
online sharing of progressive interpretations of various cultural
practices and teachings among a range of marginalized groups is
a particularly promising way of dealing with these difficulties.
18
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This process is underway in diverse religious and cultural
contexts and I think it is of considerable interest. In this
connection, we can mention the online interactions of WLUML
(Women Living under Muslim Laws 11), as well as similar
revisions proposed by groups of Jewish and Christian women. I
suggest also that an appropriate role for outsiders in these
contexts is to stand in solidarity with these groups, in new
relations of what I call transnational solidarities. 12
It is also possible to regard universal norms like human
rights as open to local interpretations, in ways that Martha
Nussbaum has also argued. 13 Moreover, there can be some
cultural variability admitted in the priority given to various
human rights, regardless of the UN understanding of them as
equally essential. But the appropriate scope to be given to
regional or local cultural differences in the interpretation of
human rights norms remains a question, as does the issue of how
to take into account the inequalities in position among the
interlocutors in cross-border discourses. The question of
19
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tolerating deeply inegalitarian or oppressive cultural practices is
a more difficult one than tolerating statements in discourses, and
I have previously proposed that the limit is set by a range of
human rights. Yet, in contrast to prevailing liberal approaches, I
am not even sure that toleration is the optimal word for what is
required here. It is clear in any case, that whatever sort of
recognition is called for cannot eliminate the possibility of
criticism of unjust or oppressive practices, and several authors
have pointed to the important distinction between offering
criticism and attempting to enforce agreement. 14
The mention of criticism here raises the important aspect
of self-criticism as a feature of effective deliberation, whether
online or offline. If discourse is to take account and acknowledge
inequalities in the starting positions and background life-world of
participants, it needs to proceed with self-awareness of these
factors in the interlocutor's own case, including awareness of
relative (and unearned) privilege. Such discourse is also
enhanced by some social theoretic understanding of the
20
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oppressive social conditions and the ways that diverse
participants may have benefited from them. Although this is a
rather demanding expectation of discursive participants, it is hard
to see how intercultural dialogue can succeed in the absence of
these conditions. These critical and self-critical aspects of the
discursive process also involve attention to relevant differences in
order to compensate for them with a view to establishing real
equality among the paliicipants. An idea of this sort may have
been behind Iris Young's concerns with special representation for
oppressed groups and with the possibility of a veto to be
exercised by them in deliberations about policies that importantly
affect their interests. IS Whether or not those specific proposals
are desirable or realistic, they do point to the significance of
taking into account the diversity in concrete circumstances that
people bring to deliberations. They require in turn a
contemporary version of the critique of ideology, that is, of one-
sided and distorting perspectives that can arise from the
differently constituted life worlds and different relational
21
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standpoints that people bring to these deliberations. Needed here
is some awareness of the perspectival and potentially ideological
character of a position--of the degree to which holding it serves
one's interests and presupposes a particular standpoint and a
particular set of background cultural practices and history, which
may themselves entail elements of oppression or residues of
colonialism.
In addition and more positively, it is normatively
desirable for participants to be willing to learn from the others
who are interlocutors in the dialogue, and to attempt to arrive at
mutual agreements. This is turn presupposes a sort of empathic
understanding of the position of others, both of what they say and
of the conditions that may lead them to adopt their points of
view. Successful deliberations also presuppose a disposition to be
responsive to others and even--though more demandingly--what
we could call a shared commitment to justice. The dialogue in
turn, when it operates in good conditions such as these, can
enhance these very dispositions and commitments. Another
22
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challenge concerns the need, as one author puts it, to "attend to
what remains unspoken, who is absent, and those who the words
are unlikely to reach.,,16
The approach to dialogue along these lines, admittedly
quite demanding, supports a notion of what I have called
concrete universality, i.e., a universality that at least partly
emerges from dialogue, where the specific background conditions
and different situations of people (including oppressive
conditions and relations) are taken into account and efforts made
to correct for them. 17 Nonetheless, an abstractly universalist
moment is also crucial here, namely, one characterized by equal
recognition of persons and respect for their human rights. 18 I
have argued that this recognition is based on their equal agency,
where agency is given a relational and transformational
interpretation, that is, is understood as developing over time
through concrete relationships. Nonetheless, as a power of self-
transformation it is a fundamental characteristic of human
beings. 19To the degree that the conditions of such agency are
23
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multiple, and include such features as security, liberty, means of
subsistence and health, these conditions can be specified in a
more or less universalistic set of human rights20 (and can also be
specified in terms of human needs or even perhaps in terms of the
alternative notion of fundamental human interests).
Given the importance of fulfilling basic human rights,
including economic ones, as conditions of agency, we can
observe in addition that deliberative discourses are more likely to
succeed if they are based on the achievement of reasonable levels
of economic well-being among participants. This sort of
interdependence was recognized early in the philosophical
discussions of human rights by Henry Shue in his argument that
the realization of basic rights to democratic participation and
subsistence mutually implicate each other.21 Subsistence is
required for democratic participation and opportunities for
genuine participation help to insure the realization of people's
rights to subsistence. We can further see how this observation
would in turn support a strong connection between global justice
24
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and democratic deliberation across borders, themes that have
often been treated separately in the literature.
Some Implications of the Philosophical Framework for
Structuring Online Democratic Deliberations
There are, of course, some exciting developments in
online communications, including various sorts of dialogues that
stretch across borders. The sphere of national politics includes
numerous blogs and forums, along with online organizing, which
have come to play an important role, for example, in the United
States, where they exerted influence in the recent US presidential
elections. Nonetheless, it is possible to overstate the significance
of such online activities, even in the case of emergent
participatory or deliberative forums that specifically aim to
enhance democratic participation through sophisticated online
software or through new ways of organizing online discourse.
Most of these democratic forums have been local (e.g., in
London), but even when open to distant others, they have so far
25
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been subject to a certain randomness in regard to who hears about
them and who gets to participate in them. It is an open question
whether these forums can be said to be representative of citizen
views generally, or even of the views of their direct participants.
Further, like most online communities, they seem to have a
tendency to discourage dialogue among people with conflictual
perspectives while encouraging discussions among those who
agree. While this is probably felicitous from the standpoint of
political organizing, it does not seem conducive to norms of
deliberation among people with fundamentally divergent political
Views.
Further, the entire online sphere can be subject to the
charge of being exclusionary in view of the digital divide. Aside
. from the costs of access, as noted previously many effective
cross-border dialogues take place only among elites drawn from
across various national governments, or else operate within the
upper echelons of institutions of global governance. Civil society
organizations may themselves have trouble being representative
26
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of their members or of the people they are trying to help; and
sometimes their leadership is self-selected from among the most
active participants in the organization. Within the range of online
dialogues, then, it would indeed be a step forward to find ways of
representing the interests of distant people who are increasingly
affected by globalization, but that remains a challenge for the
future. Moreover, it would be desirable to design dialogues that
elicit stakeholder input in the governance of global corporations.
But at present, consulting with stakeholders or enabling their
participation, at least in regard to stakeholders around the world,
remains an elusive goal to the degree that it is pursued at all. We
can further see that in all of these developments, there is a need to
avoid giving the mere appearance of participation if the real
power still resides with powerful governmental elites or
corporations, whether at national or transnational levels. In these
cases, it sometimes seems that proposals of deliberative
democracy may only serve to obscure the facts on the ground.
27
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Despite these admitted difficulties, I would like now to
propose one promising new direction for facilitating online
deliberations in the global public sphere, which is rather
elementary but has not received attention as of yet. Instead of
moving directly to the development of deliberative software
designed to instantiate the features of free and equal participation,
whether moderated or not, we can propose the importance of
highlighting and dealing with the basic normative or descriptive
concepts that arise in these discourses where the concepts are
contested among cultures. We do not have to subscribe to
Gallie's notion that many normative concepts are essentially
contestable-with deep and irremediable divisions concerning
their meaning-to observe that the contrasting uses of them when
unacknowledged can generate misunderstandings and block
agreements.22 This is not, of course, to imply that ethnic, cultural,
and political disagreements are reducible to disputes about words,
nor that they are correctable without attention to other factors as
well, especially disparities in economic and political power.
28
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Nonetheless, if dialogue proceeds at cross purposes, it
exacerbates misunderstandings and makes the requisite
deliberation in the public sphere and the institutions of global
governance less likely to occur.
If we grant that in dialogue and discussion among widely
distributed participants, the cultural locations and backgrounds of
these dialogue participants will influence their uses of language,
then it may well be that the terms used in the discussion will
sometimes have different meanings for each of the interlocutors.
This is likely to lead to misinterpretation, and accentuate
disagreements. For example, value terms like just or unjust, and
even supposedly descriptive terms like terrorist, can have
different meanings in different contexts. A proposal that I would
make here is to develop a software environment that could
monitor dialogues and provide input to the various authors when
the terms they use have multiple meanings within the context of
the discussion. This software would highlight the contested
terms, present a range of different uses and meanings to the users,
29
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and enable these authors to choose which of these they intend,
thereby also helping them also to become aware of the alternate
interpretations.23 Initially, this process would necessarily be
limited to text-based discussions whether through email, forums,
or chat sessions, but eventually there might be an analog
developed for video communications as well. If participants
become more aware of the one-sidedness of their interpretations,
as well perhaps of their own background assumptions, it is
possible that agreements will be facilitated.
Especially in view of the difficult problem of the digital
divide, we can observe the concomitant importance of developing
opportunities for face-to-face discussion along with new modes
of representation for people affected by the policies of global
-governance institutions. Concerning the first of these, we can
note that despite the felicity of using new technologies for global
interactions, whether they take place through cell phones or
computers, there seems to be no substitute in the present for some
component of actual rather than virtual dialogue among people
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affected by policies or plans. In regard to new forms of
transnational representation, this could involve literal
representatives, hopefully chosen democratically, or it could
involve new forms of deliberative polling or deliberative
democracy among representative individuals,24 in this case
representing those affected by the policies or transnational plans
in question. Such deliberative polling has been mainly advocated
for the case of local and national politics, but it seems relevant to
global politics as well. And it would appear most easily
achievable there if it were to proceed online, though this in turn
raises again the question of the digital divide and how to manage
it for such cases. Thus it is clear that creating these new
opportunities for dialogue does not in itself solve the problems of
lack of access to informational resources25 or the actual poverty
that constrains the opportunities for cross-border political
discourse or deliberation.
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These problems again crucially higWight the importance of
having our discussions of democracy and of global justice, and
specifically of economic human rights, proceed in tandem.
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